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CHILEAN ANTITRUST POLICY: SOME
LESSONS BEHIND ITS SUCCESS
FRANCISCO AGÜERO*
I
INTRODUCTION
Sixty years ago, the state played an active role in the Chilean economy. Since
then, the country has undergone a failed attempt to introduce socialism through
democracy, as well as a coup d’état that instated the Chicago School’s marketbased fiscal and monetary policies. Since 1990, the country has returned to a
democratic path, correcting the economic model imposed by the military regime
but without abandoning enforcement of competition policy. In fact, Chile
introduced and established competition policy with steady advances and unusual
success. It has been a bumpy road, but it has allowed competition agencies to
find, prosecute, and fine more firms that infringe competition law. In the last
decade, several cartels affecting consumers in markets such as poultry,
pharmaceuticals, bus services, and healthcare have shifted the public opinion
towards a strong repudiation of the most reprehensible anti-competitive
practices.
The following pages attempt to determine the possible reasons for and lessons
behind Chile’s success, with a particular emphasis on analyzing anti-competitive
practices and only brief mention of merger control. Accordingly, part II first
explores the historical background of Chile’s current competition law regime.
This narration shows also how political support has helped and empowered
competition agencies in Chile, especially in the last decade. These findings
suggest that more than good rules and good institutional design are important to
achieving good results in antitrust policy: political support is a key factor to its
status. Without this support, results of competition policy enforcement would
probably differ. Part III addresses the structure and description of Chile’s current
competition policy institutions. Part IV describes substantial issues in
competition law in Chile that show that prohibited conducts are not limited to
cartels and monopolization or abuse of dominance, but extend also to restrictions
imposed by the Administration, which could endanger competition. Part V
examines how public enforcement has focused since 2008 mostly to prosecute
cartel cases, leaving private parties to prosecute by their own means residual
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cases of abusive practices—both exploitative and exclusionary. The public
economic prosecutor has yielded a successful record, which has also contributed
to the success of the system perceived by the public. After scrutinizing the
enforcement of competition law in Chile, part VI provides a general assessment
of the system and its implementation. Finally, part VII closes with some
conclusions and possible lessons in competition policy to be drawn from a country
with a unique history of economic development.
II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: GROWING POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR
COMPETITION POLICY
Chile’s first competition law was Law No. 13,305, enacted in 1959.1 The law
created an Antitrust Commission (Comisión Antimonopolios) comprised of a
Supreme Court Justice and two chief financial regulators. In 1963, legal reform
established the National Economic Prosecutor (NEP)2 to represent the general
interest of the economic community before the courts, including the Antitrust
Commission.
Prior to 1959, the Klein-Saks Mission, an American consultancy hired by the
Chilean government, issued a report that recommended establishing antitrust
policy in the country.3 The report was mostly devoted to financial and monetary
issues, focusing on severe inflation in the country.4 However, one of the few
proposals of the Klein-Saks Mission that was not abandoned,5 was a competition
statute contained in a section of Law No. 13,305.6 But that law had little influence
on the Chilean economy, and in its early years, the NEP did not have an active
role in the prosecution of anti-competitive conduct.7
In 1969, Unidad Popular’s presidential program indicated that, if they won
the election, the first economic measure would be to nationalize Chile’s primary
mineral wealth and resources, which were in the hands of foreign capitalists and

1. Law No. 13,305, Apr. 6, 1959. Law No. 13,305 was a miscellaneous law, which dealt with
economic and financial issues. In its section V, it contained the competition act.
2. Law No. 15,142, Jan. 13, 1963.
3. Klein & Saks, “El Programa de Estabilización de la Economía Chilena y el Trabajo de la Misión
Klein & Saks” Reformas económicas e Instituciones Políticas: la experiencia de la Misión Klein-Saks en
Chile 273 (J. Couyoumdjiam ed., 2011).
4. Ricardo Paredes, Jurisprudencia de las Comisiones Antimonopolios en Chile [Jurisprudence of
the Antitrust Commissions], 58 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS 229 (1995).
5. Rolf Lüders, “La Misión Klein-Saks, los Chicago Boys y la política económica” Reformas
económicas e Instituciones Políticas: la experiencia de la Misión Klein-Saks en Chile 215 (J.
Couyoumdjiam, ed. 2011).
6. PATRICIO BERNEDO, HISTORIA DE LA LIBRE COMPETENCIA EN CHILE 1959–2010 [HISTORY
OF COMPETITION POLICY IN CHILE 1959–2010] 39 (2013).
7. Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Exámenes inter-pares de la política y del derecho de la
competencia en América Latina: Un seguimiento Argentina, Brasil, Chile, México y Perú [Peer Reviews
of Politics and Competition Law in Latin America: A Look at Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru]
15 (2007).
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“internal monopolies.”8 As expressed by Patricio Meller, before Salvador
Allende’s socialist government came into power in 1970, left-wing parties
characterized the Chilean economy as, among others, monopolist and capitalist.9
The Unidad Popular’s response was not state-run competition policy, but rather
a wave of expropriations and nationalizations of privately owned firms.10 In fact,
to the Chilean left, even before Unidad Popular’s program, competition
legislation had failed as a solution to the problem of cartels and the abuse of
monopolies.11
The Unidad Popular’s plans were ultimately frustrated by the Military Junta’s
1973 coup d’état. In contrast to the position of the Unidad Popular government,
the value of economic freedom was primordial in the eyes of the Junta. The
founding document of the Junta’s economic program—known as El Ladrillo, or
“The Brick”—posited that it was crucial to establish competitive markets12 and
minimal state regulation in order to prevent rent-seeking practices.13 The
liberalization process would go even beyond deregulating markets and
privatization policies.14 According to Meller, after 1973, “the market and private
sector became the answer to everything.”15
The Brick eliminated most price control regulations, limiting them to public
utilities, and encouraged the use of antitrust law as a means to attack cartels.16

8. Unidad Popular, Programa básico de gobierno de la Unidad Popular [Basic Program of the
Government of the Unidad Popular] 20 (1969) [hereinafter “Unidad Popular”].
9. PATRICIO MELLER, UN SIGLO DE ECONOMÍA POLÍTICA CHILENA (1890–1990) [A CENTURY
OF CHILEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1890–1990)] 111 (3d ed. 2007).
10. Unidad Popular, supra note 8, at 19.
11. See generally Ricardo Lagos, La Concentración del Poder Económico. Su Teoría, Realidad
Chilena [The Concentration of Economic Power. Its Theory and Chilean Reality] (1962) (“And the truth
is that the great [wealth] concentration that exists in Chile, this real monopoly extends to all activities
and won’t be destroyed with small amendments, or ‘antitrust’ laws, as we know, which are used against
bakeries, fruit shops owners, butchers, etc.”) (“Y la verdad es que esta gran concentración que existe en
Chile, este verdadero monopolio que alcanza a todas las actividades no va a poder ser destruido con
pequeñas modificaciones, o con leyes “antimonopólicas” como las que en la actualidad conocemos entre
nosotros, y que se aplican a los panaderos, a los dueños de verdulerías, a los matarifes, etc. etc.”)
[translation by author].
12. In this way, in the following years, several market solutions were introduced in Chile in areas
such as higher education, electricity, and water markets.
13. In its early years, the economic program of the Junta was known as El Ladrillo (“The Brick”)
and was elaborated by conservative economists during Allende’s government. The Brick became public
only in 1992. See generally SERGIO DE CASTRO, “EL LADRILLO”: BASES DE LA POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA
DEL GOBIERNO MILITAR CHILENA [“THE BRICK”: BASIS OF THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE CHILEAN
MILITARY GOVERNMENT] (Centro de Estudios Públicos ed. 1992).
14. According to Andrés Solimano, it was also an attempt to introduce new values and change the
culture of Chilean society as a whole. ANDRÉS SOLIMANO, CAPITALISMO A LA CHILENA: Y LA
PROSPERIDAD DE LAS ÉLITES [CHILEAN CAPITALISM AND THE PROSPERITY OF THE ELITE] 65 (2012).
15. Meller, supra note 9, at 331. See also Tomás Moulian, Chile actual. Anatomía de un mito [Chile
Today. Anatomy of a Myth] 197–200 (1997); Gabriel Salazar & Julio Pinto, Historia Contemporánea de
Chile. Vol. III. La Economía: Mercados, Empresarios y Trabajadores [Contemporary History of Chile.
Vol. III. The Economy: Markets, Industries and Workers] 50–53 (2002).
16. DE CASTRO, supra note 13, at 89.
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The decision to reinforce competition law soon followed. Thus, shortly after the
military coup, in December 1973, the Junta enacted Decree-Law No. 211.17
In 1974, the Military Junta explicitly rejected intervention techniques such as
central state economic planning in its Declaration of Principles (Declaración de
Principios).18 However, the Military Junta admitted some planning in the
economy, but recognized the key role of private-property rights and
subsidiarity—a principle that presupposes “the right to free initiative in the
economic field.”19 The Junta further stated that, “it is [the State’s] mission . . . to
adopt the measures that effectively ensure competition [policy] and the necessary
control of private parties, to avoid any form of abuse or monopoly.”20 The 1980
Constitution did not explicitly refer to this principle with respect to the state, but
it did establish the individual-centred right to develop any economic activity—
the freedom of enterprise.21 At the time, the adoption and promotion of
competition policy and liberalization of markets was not a contentious issue as
might be expected, because the military regime closed media and established
press censorship as soon as they rose to power,22 and many opponents of a market
economy were exiled from the country. Universities, that could have been critical
of the economic model, suffered state-intervention, and dissident economic
academics were fired. The crudest example of this occurred in 1976 in
Washington, D.C., when the Chilean secret police assassinated Orlando Letelier,
Allende’s former ambassador to the United States. A couple of weeks before his
assassination, Mr Letelier had linked the Chicago Boys’ market-based policies
and repression.23 Naomi Klein has argued that this assassination could be
connected to Letelier’s critical assessment of the economic reforms.24
Decree-Law No. 211 established the foundations of modern competition law
in Chile, substantially reforming the rarely enforced Law No. 13,305. Decree-Law
No. 211 created a different institutional setting from the one designed in Law No.
13,305. On a regional level, Decree-Law No. 211 created the Central and thirteen
Regional Preventive Commissions, which were mostly consultative bodies, in
order to push the heavily regulated economy towards a more liberalized market

17. Decree-Law No. 211, Dec. 22, 1973 [hereinafter Decree-Law 211 (1973)].
18. Declaración de Principios de la Junta de Gobierno [Declaration of the Principals of the
Government Junta], Mar. 11, 1974.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Constitución Política de la República de Chile [C.P.] art. 19 (1980).
22. Junta de Gobierno, Bando No. 15. Censura y clausura de medios [Proclamation No. 15.
Censorship and media closing] Sept. 11, 1973.
23. Orlando Letelier, Economic ‘Freedom’s’ Awful Toll; The ‘Chicago Boys’ in Chile, 8 REV. OF
RADICAL POL. ECON. 44–52 (1976).
24. Naomi Klein, Orlando Letelier: el que lo advirtió, in ORLANDO LETELIER: EL QUE LO
ADVIRTIÓ: LOS CHICAGO BOYS EN CHILE [ORLANDO LETELIER: HE WHO WARNED: THE CHICAGO
BOYS IN CHILE] 35–36 (Miguel Lawner & Hernán Soto eds., 2011) (“it is difficult not to think that
[Letelier’s] murder was an act of vengeance for the text that you have now in your hands”) (“es difícil no
pensar que el asesinato fue un acto de venganza por el texto que ahora usted tiene en sus manos”)
[translation by author].
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economy.25 The Preventive Commissions could also conduct ex officio
proceedings, requesting the NEP’s Office (NEPO) to investigate possible
infringements of competition law.26 This role was crucial in the early years of the
military government, which was a time of transition towards competitive
markets.27 Indeed, the Central Preventive Commission continued to be an active
institution until its dissolution in 2003,28 issuing more than 1,200 decisions in thirty
years.29 The initial promotion of competition policy in an economy that was
moving from a socialist revolution to a capitalist one, needed more and better
competition institutions.
On a national level, Decree-Law No. 211 created the five-member Resolutive
Commission (Comisión Resolutiva).30 Like the Preventive Commissions, the
Resolutive Commission could start ex officio inquiries or pursue NEPO’s or
private claims. Additionally, it could issue general regulations, propose legal or
regulatory amendments, and request criminal sanctions.31 However, even until
2003, both the Central Preventive Commission and the Resolutive Commission
held their respective sessions in the same area at NEPO’s offices in Santiago, and
lacked of budget and staff. 32 Members of Preventive Commissions and the
Resolutive Commission worked ad honorem in their antitrust duties.33 The
members of these commissions were appointed and lacked sufficient
independence from political authorities. Before the 2003 reform, the institutional
design for competition authorities in Chile resembled a bifurcated administrative
model. In it, NEPO investigated and submitted cases before another
administrative agency–court—a regional preventive commission, the Central
Preventive Commission, or the Resolutive Commission.
After almost twenty years of continuing work and success in regulated
markets,34 the institutional design started to show cracks and the need of reform.
Thus, in the mid-nineties, a well-reputed economist—and former member of the
Central Preventive Commission—argued that the appointment of two of the
members of the Commissions by the politicians could present probable

25. Decree-Law No. 2760, July 3, 1979.
26. Decree-Law 211 (1973), supra note 17, at art. 6, art. 8(d).
27. Law No. 19,911, CREACIÓN DE TRIBUNAL DE DEFENSA DE LA LIBRE
COMPETENCIA, Aug. 20, 2002, (Presidential Bill of Law creating Competition Tribunal).
28. See generally BERNEDO, supra note 6.
29. For data see Decisiones Comisiones Antimonopolio: FISCALIA NACIONAL ECONOMICA,
http://www.fne.gob.cl/jurisprudencia-en-libre-competencia/decisiones-comisiones-antimonopolio/.
30. Decree-Law 211 (1973), supra note 17, at art. 16.
31. Id. at art. 17.
32. Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Chile—Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy 28
(2004).
33. Decree-Law 211 (1973), supra note 17, at art. 30.
34. Ronald Fischer & Pablo Serra, Efectos de la privatización de servicios públicos en Chile, in
BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO, SERIE DE ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS Y SOCIALES CSC-07009 (2007); Ronald Fischer & Pablo Serra, Evaluación de la regulación de las telecomunicaciones en Chile,
6 REVISTA PERSPECTIVAS 1 (Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial, Universidad de Chile 2002).
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interferences by the Executive.35 Other Chilean academics shared this critical
assessment.36 In the late-nineties, a presidential commission devoted to assessing
reforms to economic and competition regulators, proposed the creation of a
Competition Commission, a body with national jurisdiction that would hear cases
regarding competition law, unfair trade practices, and antidumping measures.37
Its decisions would be appealable to a specialized tribunal, the National
Economic Tribunal.38
In 1999, future President Ricardo Lagos explicitly endorsed a program that
would strengthen competition policies—despite having rejected competition
policy as a tool against wealth concentration in the early sixties.39 His program
included recommendations regarding competition law, specifying the need for
institutional reforms.40
At the same time, Libertad y Desarrollo, a conservative think tank, proposed
the creation of a specialized tribunal in competition affairs because of new
enforcement powers the NEP gained in 1999.41 Thus, according to this think tank,
the 1999 legal reform evidenced the need to create an independent tribunal that
could counterbalance the NEPO with specialized and permanent judges,
including both economists and lawyers in its composition.42 This proposal led to
a growing consensus among specialists of the need to establish an independent
competition tribunal.43 Hence, political support in the field of antitrust and
competition policy translated into constant and growing support for legislative
reform. The creation of a Competition Tribunal gained definite momentum in
2001,44 after a policy was proposed by one of the largest business associations in
Chile to the Chilean government.
Thus, in the early 2000s, Lagos’ government promoted the creation of the
Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia or Competition Tribunal,
eliminating both the Preventive Commissions and the Resolutive Commission
35. Paredes, supra note 4, at 232.
36. Alberto Hurtado University, Institucionalidad Antimonopolios [Antitrust Institutions] Informe
Tasc 81, 82 (1997).
37. Comisión Presidencial de Modernización de la Institucionalidad Reguladora del Estado.
Informe final (“Informe Jadresic”) [Presidential Commission of Modernization of the Regulatory
Institutions of the State. Final Report (“Jadresic Report”)] 126 (1998).
38. Id. at 130.
39. LAGOS, supra note 11.
40. Ricardo Lagos, Para crecer con igualdad [To Grow with Equality] 5 (1999).
41. Law No. 19,610, May 19, 1999.
42. María de la Luz Domper & Pablo Kangiser, Comisión Antimonopolios: Reformas pendientes al
Decreto Ley 211 y la Defensa de la Libre Competencia [Antitrust Commission: Pending Reforms to
Decree-Law 211 and Competition Policy], 95 LIBERTAD Y DESARROLLO, SERIE INFORME ECONÓMICO
11 (1998).
43. Patricio Rojas & Félix Berríos, Competencia en Chile: Cuánto se ha avanzado, 255 SERIE
INFORME ECONÓMICO 32 (2016).
44. The Agenda Pro Crecimiento [Pro-Growth Agenda] was proposed by SOFOFA—a business
trade association—to Ricardo Lagos, then President, in the Annual Dinner of the Industry. Specifically,
the proposal contained macroeconomic and microeconomic initiatives, which tried to increase
competitiveness and sustain growth.
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and reinforcing the autonomy and independence of the competition authorities
from the NEPO and political actors.45 In the justification of the draft bill the
government argued that the over-all consensus was that even though the regional
preventive commissions and the Resolutive Commission did not fulfil
requirements of administrative independence, specialization, dedication, and
human and budgetary resources, they had accomplished their tasks successfully
during the first thirty years of Decree-Law 211.46 However, a more globalized
economy and critical comments from the private sector demanded regulatory
reform, making way for a new institutional framework for competition law in
Chile.47
The frequently cited example of intervention is the 2003 resignation of a
member of the Resolutive Commission appointed by the Executive who voted
against a proposal of a telecommunications company filed at the Commission.48
It is said that the member who resigned was subjected to strong verbal pressures
from the Chilean government.49 Notwithstanding that the resignation occurred
after the Competition Tribunal’s bill of law was sent to Congress in 2002, the
publicity of the situation may have spurred the reform. The 2003 reform also decriminalized all anti-competitive conducts, including cartels.50 Since 1973, cartels
were only once criminally prosecuted, and many argued that the criminal
prohibition was unconstitutional. Besides a case of a taxicab cartel in 1994,51 the
Resolutive Commission has requested criminal prosecution on one occasion—
the banking nationalization case.52 The constitutionality issue could have been a
problem if the general criminal offense would have been challenged at the
Constitutional Court. Another reason mentioned by a legal advisor of the
Ministry of Economy was the null dissuasive effect of the criminal offense.53 So
technical reasons existed for eliminating the general criminal antitrust offense,
though it could have been limited to a cartel offense. To counterbalance the
elimination of the criminal offense, higher fines would be imposed on anticompetitive practices.54
Subsequently, just after the creation of the Competition Tribunal in 2004,
several pages of Michelle Bachelet’s 2005 government program were devoted to
new reforms regarding competition policy matters, especially cartel prosecution
45. Law No. 19,911, supra note 27.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. BERNEDO, supra note 6, at 161.
49. Daniel Matamala, Las presiones de Lagos para favorecer a empresas españolas, CIPER CENTRO
DE INVESTIGACIÓN PERIODÍSTICA (Feb. 25, 2016) http://ciperchile.cl/2016/02/25/las-presiones-de-lagospara-favorecer-a-empresas-espanolas/ [https://perma.cc/3THP-HZV2].
50. Law No. 19,911, supra note 27, at art. 1, no. 1.
51. RESOLUTIVE COMMISSION, Ruling 413 (May 5, 1994).
52. RESOLUTIVE COMMISSION, Ruling 14 (May 18, 1975).
53. Enrique Sepúlveda Rodríguez, Nuevo Tribunal de defensa de la libre competencia y su
importancia para el sector eléctrico, 12 REVISTA DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO ECONÓMICO 147
(2004).
54. Law No. 19,911, supra note 27.
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and leniency, among others.55 The case for reform was, in part, due to the demand
for a more independent Competition Tribunal.
More significantly, the amendments were in response to a demand for more
vigorous cartel prosecution. Therefore, new enforcement powers were given to
the NEPO.56 This was a consequence of the 1999 reform, which had not given
sufficient intervention powers to the NEPO, and because the 2003 reform had
not addressed the issue.57
A 2009 event spurred a large shift in Chilean society’s approach to cartels and
competition law: the Pharmacies cartel case.58 The Pharmacies case involved a
cartel between the three largest pharmacy chains in Chile, which comprised over
90% of the market and involved more than 200 products.59 After NEPO brought
an accusation to the Competition Tribunal, one of the accused firms, FASA,
agreed to settle. FASA confessed its executives and managers’ participation in
the cartel.60 FASA’s admission of anti-competitive activity resulted in a public
outcry.61 Competition law may have been unfamiliar to the common Chilean
before the case, but since the Pharmacies case, both “cartel” and “collusion” are
words commonly and correctly used in daily conversation. The scope of products
involved in this cartel and the number of affected consumers produced a relevant
shift in the political support for competition law reforms.
In 2009, after three years of slow discussion in Congress, and after one of the
firms of the Pharmacies case settled and confessed its participation in a cartel,
congressional representatives from both conservative and progressive sectors
swiftly approved a bill promoted by Bachelet’s government, which introduced
leniency and intrusive powers in cartel cases.62
In the same year, and with the Pharmacies proceedings fully underway,
Bachelet’s government amended a draft bill criminalizing cartels,63 despite the
decriminalization reform carried out in 2003 under Lagos’s government. This was
also a shift from Bachelet’s program, which had not considered criminalization
of cartels, but rather only increasing civil fines, as a policy tool. This change of

55. Michelle Bachelet, Estoy contigo, Programa de Gobierno 2006–2010 [I am with You,
Government Program 2006–2010] 42–44 (2005).
56. Presidential Bill of Law that amends Decree by force of Law N° 1, from the Ministry of
Economy, Development and Reconstruction, Bulletin N° 4234-03 (June 20, 2006).
57. See generally Law No. 19,911, supra note 27; Law No. 19,610, May 19, 1999.
58. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Dec. 9, 2008, “Requerimiento de la Fiscalía Nacional Económica
contra Farmacias Ahumada, Cruz Verde y Salcobrand” (Chile) [hereinafter Pharmacies].
59. Id.
60. Acuerdo de conciliación Fiscalía Nacional Económica y Farmacias Ahumada S.A. 2 [Agreement
between NEPO and Farmacias Ahumada S.A.] March 13, 2009 (Chile).
61. BERNEDO, supra note 6, at 185.
62. Law No. 20,361, July 13, 2009 [hereinafter Decree-Law 211 (2009)].
63. Michele Bachelet, Indicación sustitutiva al proyecto de ley que impone penas por delitos que
atenten contra la libre competencia [Substitutive ammendment to the bill of law that criminalizes
infringments to competition law], Bill of Law No. 6438-03, June 10, 2009.
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the political attitude towards the criminal offense was a result of the public anger
after the Pharmacies cartel and also of limiting the scope of the offense to cartels.
The presidential program of President Piñera also advocated for deepening
competition in the markets. Notwithstanding, his proposal was limited to
improving the selection mechanism of the Prosecutor, advocating for the Senate’s
participation in the appointment process.64 While this legal reform was ultimately
not promoted by President Piñera, in 2011, after the NEPO alleged collusion
against three poultry meat companies in the Poultry Producers case,65 he created
a presidential advisory committee for competition matters, which studied the
criminalization of cartels and other legal changes. Piñera’s government did not
implement any of the reforms proposed by the presidential advisory committee
in 2012, probably after a split vote on criminal prosecution.66 However, after the
Supreme Court decision in the Pharmacies’ case, the National Consumer Agency
(Servicio Nacional del Consumidor) filed a parens patriae civil action for
damages caused by the cartel.67 This lawsuit was a highly controversial due to the
agency’s standing,68 and the difficulty of effectively compensating affected
consumers. But it showed that a different agency could take action on cartel
damages on behalf of consumers.
After the Pharmacies and Poultry Producers cases, members of Congress
became constant promoters of competition reform. Thus, since 2009, almost
twenty bills of law have been submitted to the Chilean Congress featuring
proposals ranging from the criminalization of collusion to the legitimization of
consumer class actions for pursuing damages in competition matters.69
More recently, in the latest presidential elections, the government programs
of the main candidates focused on the protection of competition and the
repression of practices incompatible with consumer protection. In this manner,
the right-wing candidate’s program affirmed that “consumers will be respected,
there will be more competition and safeguards because we want a country
without room for abuses.”70 For her part, President Bachelet’s government
program also sought to protect competition in specific markets, indicating that

64. Sebastián Piñera, Programa de Gobierno para el cambio el futuro y la esperanza Chile 2010–
2014 [Government Program for Future Change and Chilean Hope 2010–2014] 31 (2009).
65. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Dec. 1, 2011, “Requerimiento FNE en contra de Agrosuper y
Otros” (Chile).
66. Comisión Asesora Presidencial para la Defensa de la Libre Competencia [Presidential Advisory
Committee for Competition Law] July, 2012.
67. Servicio Nacional del Consumidor [National Consumer Agency], Feb. 1, 2013, “Servicio
Nacional del Consumidor con Cruz Verde S.A. y otros”, rol de la causa C 1940-2013.
68. Francisco Agüero & Nicolás Rojas, Legitimación del SERNAC para demandar colectivamente
los daños causados a los consumidores por conductas Anticompetitivas [Legal standing of the Consumer
Protection Service to sue damages in class actions for the damages caused to consumers by
anticompetitive practices], Santiago, 2013.
69. To search the number of bills filed by representatives in the Chilean Congress between January
2009 and February 2016, see CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS DE CHILE, www.camara.cl.
70. Evelyn Matthei, Un siete para Chile, Programa Presidencial Evelyn Matthei 2014–2018 [A
Seven for Chile. Evelyn Matthei Presidential Program 2014–2018] 7 (2013).
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the NEPO would assess markets with persistent failures or that suffered from the
impact of competition regulations, regulating when market failures justified it
and amending unjustified restrictions to correct the operation of competitive
markets.71 Additionally, reforms were promoted to strengthen the institutional
features of the NEPO and the Competition Tribunal, raise maximum fines, and
disqualify persons convicted of anti-competitive behavior from serving on
company boards and holding positions in trade associations.72
The government program also sought to reinforce regulations against
collusion, studied the criminalization of the most damaging cartels, and
established a merger control regime.73 The proposed law was enacted in 2016,
following two accusations brought by the NEPO to the Competition Tribunal
regarding cartels dealing with tissue paper74 and supermarkets.75 These two
cartels produced significant outcry in public opinion, including consumerorganized boycotts against the supermarkets.76
With the political anger against these cartels—involving one of the richest
Chilean fortunes—Law No. 20,945 was enacted in August 2016.77 Besides
establishing criminal fines for hard-core cartels, this reform allows the NEP to
prosecute cartel offenses at a criminal court only after a condemning decision of
the Competition Tribunal (TDLC),78 thereby coordinating the effects of leniency
applications and criminal prosecution. The law also incorporates interlocking
prohibitions,79 higher fines for anti-competitive practices (up to 30% of the sales
of the products associated with the infringement),80 a merger review system with
an administrative procedure and a possible review of remedies at the
Competition Tribunal,81 and ability to file anti-competitive damages lawsuits at
the TDLC.82 The TDLC is a specialized competition law tribunal constituted by
lawyers and economists with competition policy background, which decides
lawsuits and administrative petitions brought for its decision, with separate
proceedings for competition law infringement cases and other related matters
(including, merger review and rulemaking, among others).

71. Michelle Bachelet, Chile de todos. Programa de Gobierno Michelle Bachelet 2014–2018 [Chile
of All. Government Program for Michelle Bachelet 2014–2018] 61 (2013).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, October 27, 2015, “Requerimiento en contra de CMPC Tissue
S.A. y SCA Chile S.A.” (Chile) [hereinafter CPMC Tissue].
75. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, January 6, 2016, “Requerimiento en contra de Cencosud S.A.,
SMU S.A. y Walmart Chile S.A. (supermercados)” (Chile).
76. Alta adherencia en redes sociales al “boicot ciudadano” contra supermercados (Jan. 8, 2016),
LaTercera.com.
77. Law No. 20,945, Aug. 30, 2016 [hereinafter Decree-Law No. 211 (2016)].
78. Decree-Law No. 211 (2016) at art. 62–64.
79. Id. at art. 3, (d).
80. Id. at art. 26.
81. Id. at art. 46-61.
82. Id., at art. 30.
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Because of these cartel accusations, support for reforms to the competition
law is wide and transversal. Even congressional representatives of the
Communist Party voted for the creation of an Investigation Committee in the
Chamber of Representatives for cartels and the causes that could have favored
them.83 Thus, politicians have made competition policy reform a central part of
their agenda, showing an unusual area of regulatory consensus between
liberalized market promoters and robber-baron prosecutors.
Naturally, not all Chileans shared the Junta’s devotion to markets and
competition. Even at its inception, some conservative authors opposed the
imposed free-market model, naming it an “anti-state system.”84 Although the end
of the military regime in 1990 marked a political shift toward a social market
economy, a quarter of a century later, support for competition policies and
repression of cartels transcends political party lines and is not solely a monopoly
of the right. Such policies even receive the recent and explicit support of the
Communist Party, at least in the prosecution of cartels.85 Despite the consensus
in favor of a market-based economy, there are differences in the suggested means
of implementing reforms. On the one hand, conservative think tanks have played
a relevant role promoting institutional reforms such as the Competition
Tribunal,86 though paradoxically in other cases they have argued against
increasing fines or criminal punishment for anti-competitive practices.87 On the
other hand, and even before the return of democracy in 1990, liberal and
progressive think tanks were instrumental in promoting free markets while
emphasizing the state’s role in regulating markets.88 The system is a legacy of the
dictatorship, but it is strongly accepted, showing how a “culture of competition”
has grown and nurtured in Chile, between the private and public sector and
throughout the political spectrum.89
Consequently, there is an important political push to improve the institutional
character of competition law, elevating it to the highest international standards
and seeking greater independence for the bodies that defend it. Legal reform
coupled with such political support helps obtain positive and efficient results.

83. Bancada PC-IC valoró creación de comisión investigadora por colusión del papel tisúes,
CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS DE CHILE (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.camara.cl/prensa/
noticias_detalle.aspx?prmid=127905 [hereinafter Bancada PC-IC].
84. Mario Góngora, Ensayo histórico sobre la noción de Estado en Chile en los siglos XIX y XX
[Historical essay on the notion of State in Chile, during the XIX and XX centuries] 134 (1981).
85. Bancada PC-IC, supra note 59.
86. Domper & Kangiser, supra note 42.
87. Libertad y Desarrollo, Colusión: ¿Sanción Penal? [Cartels: Criminal Offense?], 915 TEMAS
PÚBLICOS 4 (2009).
88. MANUEL GARATE, LA REVOLUCIÓN CAPITALISTA DE CHILE (1973–2003) [THE CAPITALIST
REVOLUTION IN CHILE (1973–2003)] 362 (2012).
89. Umut Aydin & Tim Büthe, Success and Limits of Competition Law & Policy in Developing
Countries: Explaining Variations in Outcomes; Exploring Possibilities and Limits, 79 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at 9–12.
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III
STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURE OF THE CHILEAN COMPETITION POLICY
REGIME
A. Structure and Appointments of the National Economic Prosecutor’s Office
According to Decree-Law 211, the NEPO is a decentralized public service,
with legal personality and assets of its own, independent from any other entity or
service, and subject to the surveillance of the President of the Republic, through
the Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism.90
The NEPO is headed by the National Economic Prosecutor (NEP), who is
appointed by the President through a selection process of senior public officials
provided by Law 19,882.91 Exceptionally, the NEP remains in office for four years
and may be re-appointed only once. He can only be removed as ordered by the
President, with the approval of the Supreme Court, upon request of the Ministry
of Economy, Development and Tourism. The removal must be issued by the
Supreme Court’s plenary, convened to that effect and must garner the vote of the
majority of its members in cases of mental incapacity or manifest negligence in
the performance of his duties.92
This law provides a mechanism for selection of civil servants that is
meritocratic but also has a political component, since the NEP is eventually
appointed by the President, after a Civil Service proposal. For example, the
current NEP, Felipe Irarrazábal (appointed in 2010, and reelected in 2014 until
2018) is a Fulbright scholar, and prior to his appointment was a partner at a top
Chilean law firm and professor of economic law at one of the best Chilean
universities.93 The former NEP, Enrique Vergara, was appointed by the President
in 2006 through a different process, and after leaving the NEPO in 2010, worked
shortly in a medium-size law firm, before being appointed to the Competition
Tribunal in 2012.94
The staff and personnel of the NEPO must provide exclusive dedication to
performing their positions, which are incompatible with all other duties in the
Administration of the State, except university lecturing.95 The prosecutor’s staff
has a special system of compensation, which is higher than the scheme for the
Chilean Public Administration but equivalent to economic utility regulators.96

90. Decree-Law No. 211 art. 33, Nov. 14, 2003 [hereinafter Decree-Law 211 (2003)].
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. The profile of the current NEP is available online. See, e.g., Biography of Felipe Irarrázabal
Philippi, Who We Are, FISCAL NACIONAL ECONÓMICO, http://www.fne.gob.cl/fne/organigrama/fiscalnacional-economico/ [https://perma.cc/7AJQ-2LKE].
94. See Biography of Enrique Vergara V, TRIBUNAL DE DEFENSA DE LA LIBRE COMPETENCIA,
http://www.tdlc.cl/tdlc/enrique-vergara-v/ [https://perma.cc/3P4Q-UCQQ].
95. Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, at art. 38.
96. Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, art. 36–37.
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According to the law, the NEP is independent from the authorities and
tribunals and has broad powers to investigate competition law infringements.97
This independence extends even to the ability to prosecute public officers and
regulators.98 The NEP represents the general interest of the economic community
before courts.99 Therefore, the NEP may defend the interests entrusted to him or
her, in the manner deemed lawful, according to his or her own assessment.100
B. Investigations And Administrative Procedure
The NEP has the power to conduct investigations deemed appropriate to
prove infringement of Decree-Law No. 211, and may provide notice of its
initiation to the affected party.101 However, with the knowledge of the President
of the Competition Tribunal, the NEP may determine that the investigations
conducted ex officio or by virtue of complaints are restricted or confidential,
which could be the case with cartels.102 The NEP also may act as a party
representing the general interest before the TDLC and the courts of justice, with
all duties and powers vested in that role.103 Criminal investigations and causes of
that nature are excluded from the NEP. This is especially relevant due to the recriminalization of cartels—participating in a cartel was once a criminal offense,
was de-criminalized in 2003, and it became a criminal offense again in 2016.104
During investigations, the NEP may request the TDLC to adopt precautionary
measures regarding the investigations the NEPO is undertaking.105 The NEPO
may request any information from public agencies and private parties for ongoing
investigations.106 During investigations, the NEP may also summon for or request
a written declaration from legal representatives, administrators, consultants, or
dependents of the entities or people that could have knowledge of facts, acts, or
conventions that are the subject of the investigations.107
In that sense, the NEPO does not have to prosecute all private complaints.
Since 2009, the NEPO must to receive and investigate, according to its duties, the
complaints made by private parties with respect to actions that could infringe the
norms of the present law. But the NEPO may determine if an investigation must
be made or the complaints formulated dismissed within a sixty-day period. The
97. Id. at art. 39.
98. See generally Nicole Nehme, Aplicación de las normas de defensa de la competencia a los
Organismos de la Administración del Estado [Competition Law applied to Administrative Bodies], in LA
LIBRE COMPETENCIA EN EL CHILE DEL BICENTENARIO, [COMPETITION LAW IN BICENTENNIAL
CHILE] 318 (2011).
99. Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, at art. 39(b).
100. Id.
101. Id. at art. 39(a).
102. Id.
103. Id. at art. 39(b).
104. Decree-Law 211 (1973), supra note 17, at art. 1; Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90 at art. 1;
Decree-Law 211 (2016), supra note 77 at art. 62.
105. Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90 at art. 39(c).
106. Id. at art. 39(f)–(h).
107. Id. at art. 39(j).
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NEPO may also determine whether to summon background or declarations from
private parties that may have knowledge related to an alleged violation.108
Regarding intrusive measures, it was only after legal reform in 2009 that the
NEP could request from the TDLC and the corresponding Minister of the Court
of Appeals authorization for dawn-raiding public or private premises for
evidence of a cartel infringement. With the abovementioned authorizations, the
NEPO can wiretap communications and order any telecommunications company
to provide copies and records of transmitted or received communications
made.109
In prosecuting cartels, the NEPO must receive leniency applications from
private applicants,110 and may later file a claim before the TDLC. If the Tribunal
considers that the cartel conduct alleged by the NEPO is proven, it cannot fine
the leniency applicant unless the applicant was the organizer of the illicit conduct,
coercing the others to participate in the collusion.111
The NEPO oversees compliance with judicial decisions regarding
competition law including general rules issued by the TDLC and merger
remedies, among others.112 The NEPO issues reports requested by the TDLC
where the NEP is not acting as a party.113 The NEPO may also sign extrajudicial
agreements or settlements with agents involved in investigations for safeguarding
competition in the markets.114
After the NEPO files a claim at the Competition Tribunal, it has the same
rights and duties as a private party litigating before that Tribunal. It has been
recognized by the Competition Tribunal that it prosecutes the case in equivalent
terms as any other party with no procedural privileges towards the NEPO.115
C. Structure And Appointments Of The Competition Tribunal
The Competition Tribunal was established in 2004 after Law No. 19,911 was
enacted, amending the Chilean competition law created by Decree-Law No. 211
of 1973. The TDLC is a specialized and independent jurisdictional body, subject
to the steering, correctional and economic oversight of the Supreme Court and
whose purpose is to prevent, correct, and punish infringements to competition

108. Decree-Law 211 (2009), supra note 62, at art. 41.
109. Id. at art. 39(n).
110. Id. at art. 39 bis.
111. Id. at art. 39(b).
112. Id. at art. 39(d).
113. Id. at art. 39(e).
114. Id. at art. 39(ñ).
115. Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs:
Competition Committee, Procedural Fairness: Transparency Issues in Civil and Administrative
Enforcement Proceedings 2010 343, n.2 (2011) [hereinafter OECD Procedural Fairness] (“If it submits
charges, the FNE prosecutes the case in the adversarial procedure before the Competition Tribunal,
representing the public interest, but in equivalent terms as any other party, with no particular procedural
privileges.”).

AGUERO_PROOF_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2016]

CHILEAN ANTITRUST POLICY

12/20/2016 9:47 AM

137

law.116 Its judges are appointed through a public contest. The TDLC’s judges have
two possible professional backgrounds: three are lawyers, two are economists.
The President is also an attorney, proposed by the Supreme Court to the
President of the Republic.
A mixed composition of judges (lawyers and economists) is unusual for
Chilean tribunals. The TDLC’s model seems to be successful, because it was
followed as a model for the Environmental Tribunals.117 However, the mixed
composition is tributary of the mixed composition of the Commission established
in 1959, and of the Resolutive Commission in 1973. On the one hand, the
presence of economists as judges has been helpful and provided robust economic
justification in TDLC’S decisions. Since there are two members, there are cases
of split votes with good economic arguments on both sides. On the other hand,
the presence of judges in the TDLC with no formal legal training may produce
different or contradictory decisions in evidentiary or procedural issues.118 The
elimination of a Supreme Court judge sitting as TDLC’s President, which was the
model since 1959 until 2003, was proposed in the draft bill that allowed the TDLC
to continue. This proposal was rejected during the congressional debate, due to
reasonable arguments about Supreme Court review, the lack of competition law
experience of Supreme Court justices, and necessary specialization of judges;119
leading the way to a system where the Supreme Court proposes five candidates
to the President of the Republic.
The Competition Tribunal’s budget is approved annually pursuant to the
Public Sector Budget Law.120 Several public bodies may intervene in the process
for selecting judges. The President of the TDLC is appointed by the President of
the Republic from a roster of five candidates compiled by the Supreme Court via
a public examination and selection process. Two of the judges are appointed by
the Council of the Central Bank. The other two members, also one from each
professional area, will be appointed by the President of the Republic, based on
two nominations of three candidates, one for each appointment, compiled by the
Council of the Central Bank. In both cases, the judges are appointed or proposed
via an examination and selection process.121
The Competition Tribunal also has two alternate members, one an attorney
and the other an economist. A sort of revolving-door restriction has been set,
limiting the chance that a former NEP or person holding any other management
position in the NEPO in the year before the initiation of the selection process is
appointed, whether as a permanent or alternate member of the Tribunal.

116. Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, at art. 5.
117. Law No. 20,600 (2012).
118. Francisco Agüero & Santiago Montt, Chile: The Competition Law System and the Country’s
norms, in THE DESIGN OF COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTIONS: GLOBAL NORMS, LOCAL CHOICES 149,
182–83 (Eleanor M. Fox & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013).
119. Law No. 19,911, supra note 27.
120. Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, at art. 44(a).
121. Id. at art. 6.
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The members of the TDLC are subject to a regime of prohibitions. Therefore,
being a member of the Tribunal is incompatible with being a public employee,
administrator, private company manager or employee, or advisor in matters
related to competition law for persons under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.122
However, until recently, there has been consistent debate about the compatibility
of TDLC’s judges and other professional work exempted from the mentioned
prohibitions. In fact, at least two former judges continued working in their law
firms while serving as judges at the TDLC. Other competition law practitioners
believed these judges had a conflict of interest, and also had a comparative
advantage in their private practice. This possibility will cease in 2016, after the
enactment of Law No. 20,945. Notwithstanding, being a member of the Tribunal
is compatible with academic positions.123 Besides deciding on competition law
infringements and mergers, the Competition Tribunal may issue regulations or
instructions, which must be observed by private individuals executing or entering
into acts or contracts that are related to or that could infringe upon free
competition.124 The Tribunal may also propose the amendment or derogation of
any law or regulation which the Tribunal deems contrary to competition law, as
a constitutional review.125 The laws and regulations to be examined are chosen by
the TDLC after a petition from the NEPO, a private party, or ex officio by the
Tribunal. The TDLC may also issue special reports to rate-setting regulators
regarding
competitive
conditions
in
specific
markets
including
telecommunications, electricity, water, sewage, and natural gas.126
Private litigation before the TDLC has a broad scope, and the TDLC must
hear, upon request by any party or the NEPO, complaints about conduct that
could violate competition law. Private lawsuits or requests can be brought at the
TDLC, whether in adversarial or non-adversarial procedures.
The following figure describes the institutional arrangement in Chile:

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id. at art. 18.3.
Id. at art. 18.4.
Id. at art. 18.5.
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Thus, the 2003 legal reform established “a bifurcated model of competition
policy institutions, having on the one hand the NEPO, a specialized competition
investigative body filing claims, and on the other, the Competition Tribunal, a
specialized competition law tribunal that decides the claims and lawsuits brought
for its decision.”127 Under this bifurcated judicial system, an administrative
agency (NEPO) investigates and submits cases before a tribunal (Competition
Tribunal) that performs functions that are jurisdictional in nature (deciding
conflicts with res judicata effect). For its part, the bifurcated judicial model
constitutes a form of competition governance that privileges the rights and
freedoms of potentially affected parties by requiring the decisionmaking to be
conducted in the form of a judicial instead of purely administrative proceeding.
Given that there can be a compromise or trade-off between justice and efficiency,
or between adjudication and implementing public policies,128 efficiency and
implementation are sacrificed to safeguard justice and adjudicatory rights.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that if the bifurcated judicial model is
accompanied by legislation that is open and undetermined, the judicial body
winds up in a position as “commerce regulator.” The Tribunal will add content
to the law by resolving individual cases, where such Tribunal is the entity that
ultimately adopts the decisions of public policy that are relevant in terms of
competition.129 This has led to the conclusion that in Chilean law the TDLC is
actually a commerce regulator.130 This conclusion follows from the fact that
Article 3 of Decree-Law No. 211 is, in fact, a “blank check,” where the authority
to define Competition Law and Policy remains delegated to the TDLC mainly
through the channel of resolving disputes jurisdictionally,131 but retaining several
administrative powers, such as the power to issue general regulations. In that
sense, the Competition Tribunal is a judicial body, able to adjudicate in cases of
anti-competitive practices prosecuted by the NEPO or a private party, and in
cases of its consultative power. The TDLC will now also adjudicate as a tribunal
when it awards damages and reviews NEPO’s decisions in mergers. However, this
Tribunal has powers that are more than unusual for a judicial body, such as its
regulatory powers. Those cases demand a different approach because TDLC’s
decisions are not subject to res judicata effects.

127. Francisco Agüero & Santiago Montt, supra note 118, at 153.
128. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 1 (1983) (“In a legal culture largely oriented
toward court enforcement of individual rights, ‘administration’ has always seemed as antithetical to ‘law’
as ‘bureaucracy’ is to ‘justice.’ Law focuses on rights, administration on policy.”).
129. It can be argued that the TDLC is not a tribunal but a court, a difference not clear in Chilean
jurisdiction. This difference resembles administrative law in the United States or Canada, where tribunal
members are part of an adjudicating system where a special knowledge is relevant.
130. See generally Santiago Montt, El TDLC como Ente Regulador del Comercio [The TDLC as
Trade Regulation Agency] (2009).
131. After the amendment through Law No. 19,911, the jurisdictional quality of the TDLC is beyond
doubt.
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D. Judicial Procedures
Prosecution may be initiated before the TDLC at the request of the NEP or
by a lawsuit filed by a private party. Once the TDLC admits a complaint, it must
notify the affected party, which may reply within a fifteen-day period or ask for
an extension.132 After the term to reply has expired, the TDLC may summon the
parties to a conciliation hearing on competition law infringements.133 If the
Tribunal does not deem it pertinent, or if the conciliation procedure fails, the
TDLC can set a twenty-day period for the submission of evidence.
All evidence and background is admissible for Tribunal fact-finding
purposes.134 The Competition Tribunal may also decree ex officio evidentiary
procedures it deems convenient in any stage of the proceedings and even after
the hearing, when it is indispensable to clarify precise facts that seem obscure and
doubtful.135
Once the evidentiary period expires, the TDLC must set the date and time
for the public hearing where the parties’ attorneys may file and argue pleadings.136
When issuing its decision in a case, the TDLC considers both counterfactual
evidence and alternative scenarios based on evidence gathered in the process,
filed and produced in accordance with due process of law, in light of OECD and
ICN guidelines and legal and economic literature.137
In its final decision, besides acquittal, the TDLC may adopt the following
measures if the claimed parties are found guilty: (1) modification or termination
of acts, contracts, covenants, systems, or agreements that infringe competition
law; (2) modification or dissolution of partnerships, corporations and other legal
persons of private law that could have intervened in such acts, contracts,
covenants, systems, or agreements; or (3) imposition of fines for fiscal benefit up
to an amount equivalent to thirty percent of the sales of the infringement period
or double the economic benefit created by the infringement.138 The fines can be
levied on the corresponding legal person, its directors, administrators, and all
persons that participated in the performance of the respective act.139 The fines
levied on natural persons cannot be paid by the legal entity in which he or she
conducts duties or by the shareholders or partners thereof.140 To determine the
fines, the following circumstances, among others, are to be considered: the
economic benefit obtained because of the violation; severity of the conduct;

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, at art. 20.
Id. at art. 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at art. 23.
OECD, Procedural Fairness, supra note 115, at 344.
Decree-Law 211 (2009), supra note 108, at art. 26.
Id. at art. 26(c).
Id.

AGUERO_PROOF_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2016]

CHILEAN ANTITRUST POLICY

12/20/2016 9:47 AM

141

recidivism; and, for the purposes of lowering the fine, cooperation with the
NEPO before or during the investigation.141
The TDLC uses a special nonadversarial and administrative-like procedure
for other matters, including merger review cases (until 2016), issuing rules,
proposing law reforms, and generating sectorial law reports. After receiving a
request for a report or merger analysis, the TDLC opens the procedure with a
decree published in the Official Gazette and on the TDLC website. NEPO, public
authorities who are directly affected, and economic agents who are related to the
matter must be notified of the opening decree so that they may provide
information and economic evidence before the TDLC.142 Once the period for
information collection expires, those who have filed a request may evaluate the
NEPO’s recommendations and communicate their agreement in writing to the
Tribunal. The TDLC must then summon a public hearing, so that those who
contributed information may express their opinion. After the public hearing, the
TDLC issues its final decision.143
All TDLC decisions, except for final rulings, are susceptible to challenge
before the same Tribunal.144 All final rulings of the Competition Tribunal are
subject to appeal for reversal before the Supreme Court, whether in adversarial
or non-adversarial proceedings.145 The appeal before the Supreme Court is heard
with preference given to non-competition issues.146 The filing of an appeal does
not suspend the execution of the ruling, except in relation to the payment of fines.
The Civil Procedure Code is supplementary to the special procedure contained
in Decree-Law No. 211, regarding all that is compatible with it.147
There is an old debate about the extension of the Supreme Court’s decisions
when it reviews a Competition Tribunal decision, with the recurso de
reclamación. The debate started after Law No. 19,911 but has continued after
Law No. 20,361, due to the effect to TDLC’s decisions in judicial and non-judicial
cases.148 The term used in the law—reclamación—has not been defined, and the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is not clear either. The term reclamación is used in
different statutes in cases of judicial ability to review adjudicative bodies’
administrative decisions.149 For Supreme Court Justice Milton Juica, the problem
is that the term reclamación does not mean an appeal or an annulment, so both

141. Id. at art. 26.
142. Id. at art. 31.
143. Id.
144. Id. at art. 27.
145. Id. at art. 27, 31.
146. Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, at art. 27.
147. Id. at art. 29.
148. Agüero & Montt, supra note 118, at 118; Elina Cruz & Sebastián Zárate, Building Trust in
Antitrust: The Chilean Case, in COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA, 157 (Eleanor M.
Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2009).
149. Milton Juica, Aspectos orgánicos en la jurisdicción del Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre
Competencia y recursos procesales en el Decreto Ley N° 211 de 1973, in TRES DÉCADAS: TESTIMONIOS
Y PERSPECTIVAS SOBRE EL EJERCICIO DEL DERECHO 37–38 (Hernán Díaz ed., 2011).
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purposes must be fulfilled, allowing the Supreme Court to decide both law and
facts, as it has done in practice.150
Tapia and Montt have expressed concerns that the Supreme Court’s
deference towards the Competition Tribunal’s decision is only superficial,
because the Court has examined the standing of parties to request review, scope
of the Competition Tribunal’s powers, quality of the fact analysis, interpretation
of substantive law, and remedies imposed.151 However, a self-report by the
NEPO and the Competition Tribunal recognizes that the Supreme Court has a
high level of deference for the TDLC’s rulings, which are usually not reversed.152
But deference is lower in decisions that involve industry-specific regulators,
where the Supreme Court has quashed decisions that review administrative
policymaking.153 Experts and practitioners usually cite a case where the Supreme
Court quashed a predatory pricing decision issued by the TDLC without solid
economic reasoning.154 But that decision has been overruled, and increasingly,
the Supreme Court has devoted lengthy arguments to confirming cartel decisions
issued by the Tribunal (such as Pharmacies and Poultry Producers). Though in
some limited cases, where the TDLC has limited parties’ access to proceedings,
the Supreme Court has admitted the standing of parties banned from
participating in the TDLC. Nevertheless, these cases can be identified easily due
to the public policy and administrative law issues perceived by the Supreme
Court, because the chamber that hears the case is specialized in public law.
E. Increasing Role Of Transparency And Participation In Procedures
After the 2005 constitutional reform that established the transparency of all
State decisions—including NEPO’s and TDLC’s—concern for the right to
information has been a key issue for competition law bodies, even a hallmark of
their behavior.155 The NEPO has a website where most of its decisions are made
public,156 and where the meetings with lobbyists are posted, after the enactment
of the Lobbying Act.157 The TDLC created its website in 2006, making all files
and decisions accessible to the public.158 In 2015, the TDLC changed its website,
facilitating access to decisions, files, and evidence presented in its proceedings.

150. Id.
151. Javier Tapia & Santiago Montt, Judicial Scrutiny and Competition Authorities: The Institutional
Limits of Antitrust, in THE GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW 141 (D. Sokol & Ioannis Lianos eds.,
2012).
152. OECD, Procedural Fairness, supra note 115, at 348.
153. Id. See also Agüero & Montt, supra note 118, at 173.
154. Id. at 175–76.
155. Competition Tribunal, Sexta Cuenta Pública del Presidente del Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre
Competencia Don Eduardo Jara Miranda 8 (2010).
156. FISCALIA NACIONAL ECONOMICA, www.fne.cl [https://perma.cc/NB47-8L6H].
157. Law No. 20,730 (2014).
158. For records and claims, see TRIBUNAL DE DEFENSA DE LA LIBRE COMPETENCIA, www.tdlc.cl
[https://perma.cc/4LSG-Z5UT].
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The NEPO has consulted with the public about some of its guidelines, which
is a rare practice in Chile. Since 2009, the NEPO has issued several competition
law guidelines for leniency,159 compliance and ethics programs,160 trade
associations,161 public procurement,162 merger review,163 vertical restraints,164 and
public administration.165 These guidelines provide useful tools for practitioners
predicting how the NEPO may interpret the law.
The TDLC has also adopted the policy of public consultation about some of
its regulations that must be applied by lawyers litigating in that tribunal.166 As a
result of these policies and guidelines, practitioners have a clear understanding
that the TDLC has higher transparency than other tribunals in Chile.167
IV
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES: ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES AND CASES OF ABUSE
OF DOMINANT POSITION
Law No. 13,305, which contained the first competition law in Chile,
established an exemplary catalogue of prohibited conduct,168 but the language
was vague and made it possible to successfully accuse a firm of conduct not
specifically prohibited or listed.169 These regulations were in force until 1973,
when Decree-Law No. 211 was enacted. Decree-Law No. 211 preserved the
broad prohibitive regulation of Law No. 13,305170 and maintained the scheme of

159. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, “Guía de Delación Compensada,” (Oct. 2015) (replacing
guideline issued in October 2009).
160. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, “Programa de Cumplimiento de la normativa de Libre
Competencia,” (June 2012).
161. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, “Asociaciones Gremiales y Libre Competencia,” (Aug. 2011).
162. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, “Compras Públicas y Libre Competencia,” (Apr. 2011).
163. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, “Guía Interna para el Análisis de Operaciones de Concentración
Horizontal,” (Oct. 2012).
164. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, “Guía para el Análisis de Restricciones Verticales,” (June 2014).
165. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, “Sector Público y Libre Competencia,” (June 2012).
166. See, e.g., Competition Tribunal Internal Regulation No. 12/2009 (regarding the relevant
information for the preventive control of mergers).
167. Agüero & Montt, supra note 118, at 179.
168. Law No. 13,305, art. 173, April 6, 1959.
. . . price-fixing agreements or production, transport, or quota allocations, or allocation of
market areas; whether through agreements, bargaining or associations in order to obtain
production reductions or paralysations; whether through exclusive dealing, done by a single
person or by a firm, of different producers of the same specific good . . .
. . . convenios de fijación de precios o repartos de cuotas de producción, transporte o de
distribución, o de zonas de mercado; sea mediante acuerdos, negociaciones o asociaciones
para obtener reducciones o paralizaciones de producción; sea mediante la distribución
exclusiva, hecha por una sola persona o sociedad, de varios productores del mismo artículo
específico . . .
[translation by author].
169. OSCAR ARAMAYO, RÉGIMEN LEGAL DE LA INDUSTRIA MANUFACTURERA EN CHILE
[LEGAL REGIME OF THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN CHILE] 27 (1970).
170. See Decree-Law 211 (1973), supra note 17, at art. 1 (“Whoever executes or signs, individually or
collectively, any event, act or contract tending to impede free competition in the production or in the
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the exemplary list.171 Notwithstanding, the list of conduct specified that it was not
restrictive in nature and rounded out with a broad prohibition of: “[i]n general,
any other discretion whose purpose is to eliminate, restrict or hinder
competition.”172 Even a layperson with no legal training understands that the
expression “any event, act or agreement” amounts to a general prohibition of
human activities that could restrict competition.
The most recent version of Decree-Law No. 211 provides for sanctions
against “[t]he person that performs or enters into, individually or collectively, any
event, act or agreement that impedes, restricts or hinders competition, or that
tends to produce such effects . . . .”173 Subsequently, Article 3 lists three categories
of prohibited conduct, such as anti-competitive agreements between competitors
(cartels or collusive practices), abuse of dominant position, and predatory or
unfair trade practices seeking to reach, maintain, or increase a dominant
position.174 Nevertheless, these paragraphs are preceded by Article 3, paragraph
2, which provides that: “[t]he following, among others, shall be considered as
events, acts or agreements that impede, restrict or hinder competition or that
tend to produce such effects.”175 Consequently, Decree-Law No. 211 allows the
NEPO, private litigants, and the TDLC to interpret unlawful conducts broadly,
preserving an unusual and wide scope of application, albeit with greater
uncertainty.176
Efforts have been made to reduce the law’s vagueness. These include trying
to include a stated purpose in the law to guide TDLC decisions.177 Besides the

internal or external trade”) (“El que ejecute o celebre, individual o colectivamente, cualquier hecho, acto
o convención, que tienda a impedir la libre competencia en la producción o en el comercio interno o
externo”) [translation by author].
171. See id. at art. 2:
For the purposes specified in the preceding article, the following, among others, shall be
considered acts or contracts tending to impede free competition: a) Those referred to
production, such as quota distribution, reductions or paralysations; b) Those referred to
transport; c) Those referred to trade or distribution, whether wholesale or retail, such as
quota distribution or allocation of market zones or exclusive distribution, by a single person
or entity, of the same article of several producers; d) Those relating to the determination
of prices of goods and services, such as agreements or imposition to others.
Para los efectos previstos en el artículo anterior se considerarán, entre otros, como hechos,
actos o convenciones que tienden a impedir la libre competencia, los siguientes: a) Los que
se refieran a la producción, tales como el reparto de cuotas, reducciones o paralizaciones
de ellas; b) Los que se refieran al transporte; c) Los que se refieran al comercio o
distribución, sea mayorista o al detalle, tales como el reparto de cuotas o la asignación de
zonas de mercado o de distribución exclusiva, por una sola persona o entidad, de un mismo
artículo de varios productores; d) Los que se refieran a la determinación de los precios de
bienes y servicios, como acuerdos o imposición de los mismos a otros.
[translation by author].
172. Id. at art. 2(e).
173. Decree-Law 211(2003), supra note 90, at art. 3.
174. Id. at art. 3(a)–(c).
175. Id. at art. 3 (emphasis added).
176. ALF ROSS, SOBRE EL DERECHO Y LA JUSTICIA [ON LAW AND JUSTICE] 149 (1997).
177. Bill of Law No. 2944-03, supra note 27.
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guidelines issues by the NEPO, whose defensive value is not clear, it is generally
accepted that the Competition Tribunal’s previous decisions build a body of
jurisprudence useful for scrutinizing possible infringements. A realist vision of
law led the Chilean Congress to carry out such an approximation by eliminating
the purpose that could contain the vagueness of expressions and prohibitions of
Article 3 of Decree-Law No. 211.
Decree-Law No. 211 considered a mechanism to reduce such vagueness: a
consultative power allows the Competition Tribunal to issue a binding opinion
concerning a consultation made by an interested party of an event, act, or
agreement that could breach competition.178 A TDLC decision thereby lifts the
prohibition and authorizes the event, act, or agreement in question, exempting
the consulting party from any antitrust liability. The vagueness and
indetermination in matters involving anti-competitive unlawful acts can be
overcome, by way of a favorable consultation opinion, which gives a party “legal
certainty” with respect to the conduct.
Unfortunately, Article 3 of Decree-Law No. 211 subsists with its
indeterminate reference to passive subjects (“any”), and also with the reference
to dominance or market power of competitors and economic agents (“the person
that”).179 This does nothing but extend the application of Decree-Law No. 211 to
persons without economic power or those that are not economic agents, such as
public persons or administrative authorities, including judicial authorities.180
Decree-Law No. 211 states that its objective is to promote and defend free
competition in the markets,181 but some academics have considered this
statement imprecise and vague.182 The Resolutive Commission—the
Competition Tribunal’s predecessor—determined that the mandate of
competition law was not only to take care of consumer interests, but to also
consider the economic freedom of all participants in economic activities including
producers, entrepreneurs, and consumers, in order to benefit the society as a
whole.183 Accordingly, it stated that “the purpose of competition law is the
178. Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, at art. 18.2.
179. Id. at art. 3.
180. For a review of the state of the discussion, see generally Francisco Agüero, Derecho de la
Competencia y Concesiones de Servicio Público. El Caso de las Plantas de Revisión Técnica
[Competition Law and Public Utilities Licences: The Technical Plant Review Case] (2013).
181. Decree-Law 211 (2003), supra note 90, at art. 1. Neither the NEPO’s nor the Competition
Tribunal’s mandates extend to consumer protection nor utilities regulation. In those areas, specialized
regulators exist. In general, regulators do not have in their respective acts rules regarding competition
law nor competition policy mandates. Regulators usually do not file claims or initiate consultation before
the Competition Tribunal.
182. DOMINGO VALDÉS, LA DISCRIMINACIÓN ARBITRARIA EN EL DERECHO ECONÓMICO 96
(1992); Francisco Agüero, Nuevos elementos para el debate sobre el bien jurídico libre competencia [New
elements in the debate of the ends of competition law], 19 BOLETÍN LATINOAMERICANO DE
COMPETENCIA [LATIN AMERICAN COMPETITION BULLETIN] 127–29 (2004); Pablo Fuenzalida & Mario
Valderrama, La potestad consultiva del Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia: ¿Jurisdiccional o
administrativa?, REV. DE DER. ADMIN. ECON. No. 13 182 (2004); Jorge Streeter, Modificación de la Ley
de Defensa de la Competencia [Competition Law Modification] 26 (Working Paper, 2001).
183. RESOLUTIVE COMMISSION, Ruling 90, §17 (Jan. 28, 1981); Ruling 93, § 12 (Apr. 1, 1981); Ruling
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interest of the society in [producing] more and better goods, at lower prices,
which can be obtained ensuring liberty to all participants in economic
activities.”184 The Competition Tribunal has not substantially modified this
statement, although some tension has been introduced in cases when the Public
Administration is the accused party.
Paradoxically and simultaneously with the legislative discussion of Law No.
19,911, the United States–Chile Free Trade Agreement provides that “[e]ach
Party shall adopt or maintain competition laws that proscribe anti-competitive
business conduct, with the objective of promoting economic efficiency and
consumer welfare, and shall take appropriate action with respect to such
conduct.”185 The usefulness of this statement is debated and considered to have
only “symbolic meaning” because the competition policy chapter of the
Agreement has no formal enforcement mechanism.186 However, the TDLC has
acknowledged its use in the Chilean legal system.187 The statement, hence, is
useful. Accordingly, the importance of the juridical good—fair competition—
arises as a guide for scrutinizing conducts that could breach Decree-Law No. 211.
Law No. 13,305 of 1959 contained a prohibition on granting monopolies to
private persons, admitting that, through law, monopolies could be passed on to
public bodies if they concerned industrial or business activities.188 Granting
monopolies was prohibited in Decree-Law No. 211, of 1973 in one of its
“whereas” clauses,189 although the law simultaneously recognized that there can
indeed be efficient monopolies—state monopolies, curiously.190 Later, despite

171, § 15 (Apr. 10, 1984); Ruling 368, § 2 (Apr. 7, 1992).
184. Id.
185. United States–Chile Free Trade Agreement art. 16.1, Jan. 1, 2004.
186. See generally D. Daniel Sokol, Order without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into NonEnforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 231, 270
(2008).
187. Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia [Competition Tribunal], “FNE c. Servicios
Pullman Bus Costa Central S.A. y otros,” Rol de la causa: 224–11, § 127 (Jan. 15, 2014).
188. See Law No. 13305 art. 172, Apr. 6, 1959 (“Only by law it may be reserved to fiscal, semi-fiscal,
public, independent bodies, or local councils, the monopoly of certain industrial or commercial
activities.”) (“Sólo por ley podrá reservarse a instituciones fiscales, semifiscales, públicas, de
administración autónoma o municipales el monopolio de determinadas actividades industriales o
comerciales.”) [translation by author].
189. See Decree Law No. 211 (1973), supra note 17, at art. 1 (“That monopoly and monopolistic
practices are against a healthy and effective competition in the supply of markets, since through control
of supply or demand it is possible to fix artificial prices which damage consumer interest.”) (“Que el
monopolio y las prácticas monopólicas son contrarias a una sana y efectiva competencia en el
abastecimiento de los mercados ya que mediante el control de la oferta o demanda es posible fijar precios
artificiales y lesivos al interés del consumidor.”) [translation by author].
190. See id. at 4 (“That, however, the production of goods and services may or must, in certain
circumstances, be made through bodies with monopoly and state structure, if the goals prosecuted benefit
the community and its creation, operation and safeguards are foreseen in a law.”) (“Que, sin embargo,
cierta producción de bienes y servicios puede o debe, en determinadas circunstancias, realizarse a través
de organizaciones de estructura monopólica estatal, siempre que los fines perseguidos redunden en
beneficio de la comunidad y su creación, funcionamiento y resguardos se prevean mediante una ley
expresa.”) [translation by author].
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opinions adverse to monopolies granted by law,191 the Constitution only prohibits
State monopolies in media.192
The general prohibitions, together with the prohibition of specific conduct
such as forming cartels and abusing a dominant position, have made the spectrum
of complaints that can be heard by the TDLC broad. This broad interpretation
of the general prohibitions is a result of a vague text in the law, but also built
upon several decisions made by the TDLC and its predecessors (like the
Resolutive Commission) in the early seventies. A decision that prohibited the
nationalization of banks attempted by Allende’s government,193 and decisions
against the Chilean Central Bank provide specific examples.194 This was also a
consequence of other legislative decisions of the Junta. For instance, Decree-Law
No. 807, a law affecting the Department of Education, declared that the Chilean
government should promote competition policy in all possible issues, recognizing
that rules and regulations could affect this state policy.195 In similar terms, a law
for leasing public land for agriculture tried to encourage competition between
farmers.196 This has caused the State Administration itself and other
governmental bodies to refrain from breaching competition. Private parties know
that not only they, but also the State, can be involved in anti-competitive
practices. This topic is controversial and deals with the scope of competition law
if interdictions are broad. Here, the comparative approach goes from noimmunity of State acts to competition law, with a doctrine of a state action
immunity, as in the United States,197 to a broader approach, as the one seen in
Chile.
V
PUBLIC AND RESIDUAL PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
As stated by Hovenkamp, the most flagrant anti-competitive conduct should
be prosecuted because the total elimination of market power in the economy is
“neither attainable nor desirable.”198 So far, the prosecution of exclusionary and
exploitative practices represents sixty-six percent of the Competition Tribunal’s

191. Streeter, supra note 182.
192. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE art. 19, no. 12, ¶ 1 (1980) (“In no
circumstance may the law establish a State monopoly over the media of mass communication.”).
193. RESOLUTIVE COMMISSION, Ruling 14 (May 18, 1975). For a historical description of the conflict,
see BERNEDO, supra note 6, 53-58.
194. RESOLUTIVE COMMISSION, Ruling 33 (Aug. 3, 1977) and Ruling 239 (Aug. 26, 1986).
195. Decree-Law No. 807, Dec. 21, 1974.
196. Decree-Law No. 956, Apr. 19, 1975. In similar terms, Decree-Law No. 1341, Jan. 28, 1976.
197. See Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Policy: The Comparative Advantage of Developing Countries,
79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at 72 (comparing U.S. distrust of government with prevalence
of state-owned business entities in developing countries).
198. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 95
(2006).
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caseload.199 However, this majority is underrepresented in relation to the share
of cartel enforcement, which represents fifteen percent of the caseload.200
In light of the difficulty of proving cartel practices without sufficient evidence
of a secret agreement or disguised cartel between competitors, private disputes
normally seek compensation for damages only after a court or tribunal has
declared the existence of the cartel. Although the 2003 reform clarified that
antitrust damages could be litigated after the Competition Tribunal’s decision in
a follow-on lawsuit, some private actions had previously been filed in abuse
cases.201 More recently, private parties have sued for damages after TDLC’s
decisions in abuse cases,202 where these parties have prosecuted the case.
Consumers have rarely tried to sue for damages caused by cartels, and have had
mixed results.203 In that case, follow-on lawsuits have come only after public
enforcement.
NEPO’s prosecutions in the past years have focused mainly on cartels. Since
the legal reform of 2009, which granted the NEPO investigative powers like dawn
raids and wiretapping, together with establishing a mechanism of leniency,204
there has been a rise in prosecution of collusive conduct. Namely, the NEPO has
learned how to use the new tools to detect and prosecute cartels. Prior to
acquiring these tools, the NEPO’s record in cartel prosecution was poor, dealing
mostly with tacit collusion cases or accusations of cartels without hard
evidence.205
This is how the NEPO experienced a major shift with respect to prosecutions,
veering from charges of abuse of dominant position, which constituted the
majority of the NEPO’s claims filed at the TDLC until 2008, toward charges of
collusion. Moreover, since 2009, the NEPO has also moved to prosecuting and
sanctioning non-compliance with merger remedies,206 failure to comply with the
199. Data obtained from the 2016’s statistics provided at the Competition Tribunal’s website,
http://www.tdlc.cl/tdlc/wp-content/uploads/Estadisticas/agosto16/Contenciosas-Conductas.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZK3W-BQE2].
200. Id.
201. Supreme Court “Alex Pivcevic y otros con Lan Chile y otros,” rol 5835-2004, (Dec. 26, 2006);
10° Santiago Civil Court, “Servicios Audiovisuales Profesionales Sound Color S.A. con United
International Pictures Chile Ltda.,” rol C-782-2004, (Dec. 30, 2005).
202. 4° Talca Civil Court, “Constructora Independencia Ltda. c. Nuevosur S.A.,” rol C-6134-2010;
22º Santiago Civil Court, rol C-20891-2013, “OPS Ingenieria Limitada con Telefónica Moviles Chile
S.A.,” (June 30, 2015); 8º Santiago Civil Court, “Interlink con Telefónica Móviles”, rol C-42913-201; 20º
Santiago Civil Court, rol C-24288-2012, “Etcom S.A. con Telefónica Móvil de Chile S.A.,” (Apr. 28,
2015); Court of Appeals of Santiago, “Phillip Morris con Compañía Chilena de Tabacos,” rol 1520-2010,
(Nov. 8, 2011); 26° Santiago Civil Court, “Cementa S.A. con James Hardie Fibro.”, rol C-13272-2007,
(Apr. 24, 2009).
203. 3 Talca Civil Court, “Luis Orlando Opazo con Asociación Gremial de Buses Interbus,” rol N°
2646-2009, (Jan. 4, 2012); 11° Santiago Civil Court, “Arévalo y otros c. Farmacias Ahumada S.A.”, rol
6.046-2009, (Dec. 23, 2010).
204. Law No. 20,361, July 13, 2009.
205. Agüero & Montt, supra note 118, at 173.
206. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, June 8, 2015, “Requerimiento contra de LATAM Airline Group
S.A.” (Chile); Fiscalia Nacional Economica, June 30, 2015, “Requerimiento de la FNE contra SMU”
(Chile).
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TDLC’s general instructions—especially regarding telecommunications
matters207—and failure to comply with judgments.208 These cases represent seven
percent of the Tribunal’s caseload.209 The public prosecution of abusive practices
has focused on litigation of vertical restrictions, in cases against as Coca-Cola
bottlers,210 fire-matches211 or Unilever.212 The NEPO has retained some
prosecution of exploitative practices, mostly price discrimination or excessive
pricing cases, in services provided by utilities such water utilities213 or electric
distribution companies.214
Between the creation of the TDLC in 2004 and the reform in 2009, the NEPO
filed thirty-one actions before the TDLC. Of these legal actions, only nine were
targeted against cartels. The lack of direct evidence impeded the sentencing of
several accused companies in cases against asphalt insurance companies,215 liquid
oxygen,216 shipping agencies,217 ambulances,218 cold asphalt.219 The NEPO
encountered defeats in terms of cartel prosecution, both at the TDLC and the
Supreme Court before it obtained the intrusive powers from Law No. 20,361, in
2009.220 Hence, evidence of effective cartel prosecution came after new
investigative powers were given to the NEPO.

207. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, July 15, 2014, “Requerimiento contra Telefónica Móviles Chile
S.A.” (Chile); Fiscalia Nacional Economica, May 5, 2014, “Requerimiento contra Movistar” (Chile);
Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Jan. 29, 2014, “Requerimiento contra Claro S.A.” (Chile).
208. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Aug. 6, 2013, “Requerimiento FNE en contra de Empresa de
Ferrocarriles del Estado (EFE)” (Chile); Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Oct. 27, 2011, “Requerimiento
FNE contra la Dirección General de Aguas” (Chile).
209. Data obtained from the 2016’s statistics provided at the Competition Tribunal’s website,
http://www.tdlc.cl/tdlc/wp-content/uploads/Estadisticas/agosto16/Contenciosas-Conductas.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SLL6-Y4N5].
210. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Apr. 19, 2011, “Requerimiento contra Embotelladora Andina y
Coca Cola Embonor” (Chile).
211. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, June 20, 2008, “Requerimiento contra Cía. Chilena de Fósforos”
(Chile).
212. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Apr. 3, 2013, “Requerimiento de FNE contra Unilever Chile”
(Chile).
213. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Dec. 14, 2006 “Requerimiento contra Essbío, Essal y otras
sanitarias” (Chile).
214. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Dec. 5, 2008, “Requerimiento contra Empresa Eléctrica
Atacama” (Chile); Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Oct. 17, 2007, “Requerimiento contra Empresa
Eléctrica de Magallanes” (Chile).
215. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Nov. 26, 2005, “Requerimiento contra Isapres ING, Vida Tres,
Colmena y otras” (Chile).
216. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Aug. 3, 2005, “Requerimiento contra Air Liquide, Indura y
Praxair, productoras de oxígeno líquido” (Chile).
217. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, June 5, 2005, “Requerimiento contra Ultramar, Agunsa y otras
agencias marítimas” (Chile).
218. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, June 3, 2008, “Requerimiento contra Bertonati Vehículos
Especiales y otros” (Chile).
219. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, July 13, 2007, “Requerimiento contra MK y otras empresas
productoras de asfalto” (Chile).
220. Agüero & Montt, supra note 118, at 173.
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This shift from unsuccessful to successful prosecution of cartels took place
only as of 2009, and was driven by the Pharmacies case.221 Subsequently, TDLC
findings222 and the Supreme Court recognized that collusion was the greatest
breach of competition:
Collusion constitutes of all conducts breaching competition the most reproachable, the
most serious, because it entails the coordination of a competitive behavior of the
companies. The probable outcome of such coordination is a price increase, the
restriction of production and with it the increase of benefits obtained by the
participants.223

In its cartel prosecution, the NEPO has relied not only on intrusive measures
but also on leniency accorded to domestic and foreign companies. The first case
of leniency was between foreign companies.224 Subsequently, the information
provided to the NEPO in exchange for leniency toward companies has been used
to prosecute cartels in industries such as ground transportation, marine
transport,225 asphalt,226 and tissue paper.227 Since the implementation of the
leniency program, the NEPO has issued guidelines clarifying the criteria in 2009
and 2015.228 A difficulty that has appeared recently is that the Competition
Tribunal may reject the leniency requested by the NEPO after finding that the
leniency applicant and organizer of the cartel coerced the other members. A firm
argued this coercion defense in a recent cartel case.229 Another problem might
be the coordination between the competition law trial at the TDLC and the
possible cartel offense trial afterwards, partially treated in Law No. 20,945. The
NEPO has used dawn raids and wiretapping to prosecute cartels in the poultry,230
ground transportation,231 tissue paper,232 and supermarket industries.233
221. Pharmacies, supra note 58.
222. Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia [Competition Tribunal], Jan. 7, 2010, “FNE c.
Sociedad de Transportes Central Ltda. y otros,” Rol de la causa: 149-07.
223. Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court], Dec. 29, 2010, “FNE c. Sociedad de Transportes
Central Ltda. y otros,” Rol de la causa: 1746-2010.
224. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, July 29, 2010, “Requerimiento en contra de Whirpool SA y
Tecumseh do Brasil Ltda.” (Chile).
225. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Jan. 27, 2015, “Requerimiento en contra de Compañía Chilena de
Navegación Interoceánica S.A. y Otros” (Chile).
226. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, July 13, 2007, “Requerimiento contra MK y otas empresas
productoras de asfalto” (Chile).
227. See CMPC Tissue, supra note 74.
228. See Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Oct. 2009, “Guia interna sobre beneficios de exención y
reducción de multas en casos de colusión” (Chile); see also Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Oct. 2015,
“Guía Interna sobre Delación Compensada en Casos de Colusión” (Chile).
229. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Oct. 27, 2015, “Requerimiento en contra de CMPC Tissue S.A. y
SCA Chile S.A.” (Chile).
230. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Dec. 1, 2011, “Requerimiento FNE en contra de Agrosuper y
Otros” (Chile).
231. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, June 3, 2013, “Requerimiento en contra empresas de transporte
público de Copiapó” (Chile).
232. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Oct. 27, 2015, “Requerimiento en contra de CMPC Tissue S.A. y
SCA Chile S.A.” (Chile).
233. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Jan. 6, 2016, “Requerimiento en contra de Cencosud S.A., SMU
S.A. y Walmart Chile S.A. (supermercados)” (Chile). It should be noted that in the Pharmacies case, the
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Furthermore, the NEPO has focused its prosecution efforts on fewer cases
filed before the TDLC. During the seven-year period between 2009 and 2015, the
NEPO has filed less than thirty lawsuits before the TDLC, sixteen of which refer
to collusion charges and only six to proper abuse charges.234 Meanwhile, between
2004 and 2008, the NEPO lodged a similar number of charges before the TDLC,
including nine cartel charges.235 The NEPO has reduced the number of claims it
processes before the TDLC (from an average of over six to a little over four per
year), focusing on cartel prosecution and abandoning prosecution of abuse cases
by companies with dominant positions. The massive repudiation of anticompetitive practices by the general public, represented by cartels, makes
NEPO’s focus rational.236
The main effect stemming of the NEPO’s change in enforcement is that the
prosecution of abusive conducts has fallen upon private parties. Private parties
have prosecuted several cases of abuse of dominant position and unfair trade
practices that also affect competition policy, even without the support of the
NEPO, or even after archival decisions of NEPO’s investigations.237 Private
prosecution has led to follow-on lawsuits by the same parties trying to obtain
damages awards.
Some industries in Chile are known for having mostly private enforcement.
The pharmaceutical industry—with the exception of the Pharmacies cartel—is
one such example. In addition, private parties have repeatedly litigated
government practices they have considered anti-competitive in sectors such as
private–public partnerships (concessions), state aid, enforcement, and
regulation.238 In these cases, the NEPO has usually refrained from intervening,
with some exceptions in cases dealing with state-owned firms like railways239 or
local councils adjudicating waste management sites infringing competition policy
and public procurement regulation.240

FNE reached a judicial agreement (conciliation) with one of the accused companies (FASA), which
decided to collaborate and admit the charges brought before the Competition Tribunal.
234. See generally FISCALIA NACIONAL ECONOMICA, www.fne.cl [https://perma.cc/DL7T-HDGP].
235. Id.
236. Chilean citizens have associated cartels to abuse and competition policy. A comparison of the
search results for the terms “collusion,” “abuse,” and “competition” with Google Trends for Chile shows
a noticeable correlation, with significant peaks especially after a cartel accusation filed at the Competition
Tribunal. https://www.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&geo=CL&q=colusi%C3%B3n,competencia
,abuso [https://perma.cc/BYQ8-QVGE?type=image].
237. E.g., Silcosil Ltda., Mar. 17, 2015 “Demanda de Metalúrgica Silcosil Ltda. contra Masisa S.A. y
Otra”; Fiscalia Nacional Economica, June 12, 2015 “Informe de archivo sobre denuncia contra Masisa
Componentes SpA.” (Chile). See also TVI, July 6, 2016 “Demanda de TVI contra VTR Comunicaciones
SpA”; Fiscalia Nacional Economica, May 26, 2016 “Informe de archivo sobre denuncia contra VTR
Comunicaciones SpA” (Chile).
238. See generally Agüero, supra note 182.
239. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Aug. 6, 2013, “Requerimiento FNE en contra de Empresa de
Ferrocarriles del Estado (EFE)” (Chile).
240. Fiscalia Nacional Economica, July 31, 2008, “Requerimiento contra la I. Municipalidad de
Antofagasta” (Chile); Fiscalia Nacional Economica, Aug. 6, 2007, “Requerimiento contra la I.
Municipalidad de Curicó” (Chile); Fiscalia Nacional Economica, June 2, 2005, “Requerimiento contra
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VI
ASSESSMENT OF CHILEAN COMPETITION POLICY
General assessments of Chile’s competition policy system show positive and
efficient results. A 360° appraisal published in 2013, based on data from 2011
suggests a positive outcome.241 Recent studies reveal that consumers may shift
their consumption habits after a cartel is discovered, punishing the cartel
members242 or even organizing boycotts. In effect, some mistrust of the
institutional design of the Chilean competition law system existed in the last
decade.243 The general opinion of practitioners seems favorable, despite some
complaints.244 A recent survey shows mistrust of enforcement agencies that deal
with consumer abuse.245 And the survey identifies the existence of three cartels—
Pharmacies, Poultry Producers, and Tissue Paper—as one of the eight most
severe situations of mistrust of business. This survey also shows high
understanding of the benefits of competition policy, such as lower prices; but also
a high perception of consumer abuse by large firms.246 Moreover, ninety-seven
percent of those surveyed knew factual details of NEPO’s accusation in the
Tissue Paper case.247 These results show how competition policy has become a
key issue for consumers in Chile, and that consumers understand the risks of
threats to competition. This success comes after a long history of legal reforms,
modernizing institutions, and increasing enforcement.
From the perspective of competition law practitioners, surveys done for the
NEPO suggest that the NEPO’s effectiveness in detecting cartels has increased
significantly from 2012 to 2014.248 Lawyers also recognize the useful value of
guidelines issued by the NEPO. Despite the vagueness of the text of the
competition law, specialists value efforts to clarify it.
The history of competition law in the last fifty years shows governments and
Congresses pushing competition law forward, in constant progress. The laws have
been reviewed repeatedly in the last two decades, with major reforms in 1999,
2003, 2009, and 2016. Successive reforms have tied to fill the gaps and deficits left
by previous ones. Progressive reform accompanied by political support seems to
have improved institutional design and the enforcement of competition policy.
Coinca y la I. Municipalidad de San Bernardo” (Chile).
241. Agüero & Montt, supra note 118, at 183–85.
242. Cadem, Segundo Estudio sobre Libre competencia: “Salvando al capitalismo de los capitalistas”,
Nov. 2015, http://www.cadem.cl/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/SACDLCII.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QC9DMPB].
243. Elina Cruz & Sebastián Zarate, Building Trust in Antitrust: the Chilean Case, in COMPETITION
LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 157 (Eleanor M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2009).
244. Agüero & Montt, supra note 118, at 184.
245. Cadem, supra note 242, at 242.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Deloitte, 2° Estudio sobre la percepción del efecto disuasivo de las acciones de la Fiscalía
Nacional Económica [Second study of the perception of the dissuasive effect of the National Economic
Prosecutor’s
Office
enforcement],
http://www.fne.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Estudio_
percepcion.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB32-FY37].
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Since the early 1970’s competition law has not only been a way of controlling
private power, but also state economic power. Success has come with political
compromise with competition policy, whether by a democratically elected
government or by a dictatorship.
The vast majority of the legal reforms in the last two decades have favored
public enforcement, enhancing investigative powers. But the fact that private
prosecution has been residual to NEPO’s recent focused prosecution of hardcore cartels has been an incentive for privately enforcing competition law and
suing for damages. On this topic, the reform of Law No. 20,945 allows the
Competition Tribunal to hear damages cases, so private parties may be more
successful than they have been so far suing in civil courts. Hence, an unexpected
effect of Law No. 20,945 may be a new incentive to private enforcement of
competition law, because private parties could be more successful in this area.
Enforcement of competition law is not exclusively a matter of public prosecution.
Since public enforcement could be biased, allowing private enforcement to
private parties offers a chance to punish other anti-competitive practices.
The separation of roles stated in Decree-Law No. 211 has favored
independence of the NEPO and the TDLC and made the transition easier. The
two agencies can differ in procedures and decisions and may even amend each
other’s mistaken decisions. The NEPO appears to be an independent, effective,
and technical prosecutor.249 This autonomy may be less apparent when the NEPO
has to deal with or investigate administrative regulators.250 The TDLC has had an
important role in areas covered by sector-specific regulators and in topics such as
public policy, state-aids, state-owned enterprises, public procurement, and
regulations. In these conducts more comprehensive analysis is needed, because
the Chilean practice is expansive compared to other jurisdictions. In this specific
area, the Court has quashed TDLC’s judgments based on public law topics.251
In terms of results, the NEPO and the Competition Tribunal have achieved
excellent outcomes in cartel cases and abuse prosecution. Private enforcement
has prospered in areas that complement the NEPO’s focus, despite recent
reforms, which have not promoted such litigation—or at least have remained
neutral. Political support has increased in the last years, favoring updates of
competition law and providing resources—public funding—for investigations
and prosecutions.
VII
CONCLUSION
This article attempted to uncover possible lessons from competition policy
enforcement in Chile. Such a task is usually difficult because countries do not
follow the same historical patterns. In that regard, Chile transitioned in the last

249. Id.
250. Agüero & Montt, supra note 118, 183–84.
251. Id. at 173.
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forty years from a frustrated socialist revolutionary government established by
democratic elective mandate to a market-based economy established by a
Military Junta, and later ratified by a democratically elected government. Some
legitimacy issues in that respect—for instance, imposition of a market system by
military force—have been defeated by the strength of the results seen by the
public when competition thrives, steadily creating a culture of competition. Since
2009, the public has started to realize that cartels threaten the core of the
economic system. Citizens may ideologically disagree with the Chilean economic
model, but they share an understanding that cartels are the greatest threat to the
economy. A consensus between right and left wing politicians about the harm
caused by cartels has benefited the institutional system of competition law.
Substantive law has mattered, creating clear prohibitions of anti-competitive
practices like cartels and abusive practices, but also providing an open-ended
statutory scope of possible anti-competitive practices.
The institutional reform has worked and provided results, with a public
prosecutor and a specialized-tribunal, but also leaving space for private
prosecution.
After 2009’s legal reforms, focused enforcement has proven successful in
prosecuting and fining cartel members. A virtuous cycle started more than half a
century ago, with legal and institutional reforms, political support, and vigorous
prosecution, showing that success is not fortuitous, but built after legal reforms
that steadily improve the institutional setting and investigative powers, backed
by political and public support.
If cartels are the greatest infringement to competition law, revealing and
prosecuting them successfully shows that a system is achieving its ends and that
competition policy is working for consumers and society.

